Peer Effects in Sexual Initiation: Separating Social Norms and Partner Supply by Richards, Seth O.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Spring 5-17-2010
Peer Effects in Sexual Initiation: Separating Social
Norms and Partner Supply
Seth O. Richards
University of Pennsylvania, serichar@econ.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Labor Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/118
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richards, Seth O., "Peer Effects in Sexual Initiation: Separating Social Norms and Partner Supply" (2010). Publicly Accessible Penn
Dissertations. 118.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/118
Peer Effects in Sexual Initiation: Separating Social Norms and Partner
Supply
Abstract
Sexual activity among adolescents is associated with risks such as pregnancy and STDs, and there is
substantial policy interest in how peers influence the timing of sexual initiation. This paper measures separate
effects for two social mechanisms--peer-group norms and partner availability--using a national sample of high
school students. I develop and estimate an equilibrium search and matching model for first sexual encounters
that specifies distinct roles for the two mechanisms. Norms are defined based on the share of nonvirgins
among same-gender peers, which influences whether an individual searches for a sexual partner. Supply is
modeled with an arrival rate for partners, which depends on the search behavior among the opposite gender.
The model produces a discrete-time duration to first sex which I estimate with quarterly data on individual
virginity status constructed from the Add Health study. The endogeneity of peer behavior with respect to
individual behavior is addressed with a combination of strategies. First, I use standard instrumental variables
methods to estimate linear regressions for virginity status at the end of each grade. Instruments for group
nonvirginity rates are person-specific characteristics such as sibling structure and age of menarche, and the
regressions include school-by-grade fixed effects. This analysis demonstrates that school-based social
interactions have a large effect on sexual initiation. Second, I estimate the search and matching model via
simulated maximum likelihood, in order to decompose this composite effect into separate effects of peer
norms and partner availability. Here I control for the endogeneity of peer behavior by (a) defining the norm
effect as a function of lagged peer outcomes, (b) including a random effect that is correlated within schools,
and (c) using exogenous peer characteristics as supply shifters. I find that peer-group norms have a large effect
on the timing of sexual initiation: removing the peer influence on search decisions, 42% fewer boys and 22%
fewer girls become sexually active in ninth or tenth grade. Changes in the availability of partners at school (i.e.,
changes in opposite-gender search behavior) also have a large impact on initiation rates for boys, although not
for girls.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Economics
First Advisor
Kenneth I. Wolpin
Second Advisor
David M. Cutler
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/118
Third Advisor
Elena Krasnokutskaya & Aureo de Paula
Keywords
peer effects, social networks, adolescents, sexual behavior, search and matching
Subject Categories
Labor Economics
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/118
PEER EFFECTS IN SEXUAL INITIATION:
SEPARATING SOCIAL NORMS AND PARTNER SUPPLY
Seth O. Richards
A DISSERTATION
in
Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2010
Supervisor of Dissertation
Kenneth I. Wolpin
Walter H. and Leonore C. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences
Graduate Group Chairperson
Dirk Krueger, Professor of Economics
Dissertation Committee
David M. Cutler, Otto Eckstein Professor of Applied Economics, Harvard University
Elena Krasnokutskaya, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
A´ureo de Paula, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Peer Effects in Sexual Initiation:
Separating Social Norms and Partner Supply
COPYRIGHT
2010
Seth O. Richards
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank my thesis advisors for their dedication, support, and hours of their time:
Kenneth I. Wolpin, David M. Cutler, Elena Krasnokutskaya, and A´ureo de Paula. I
am also grateful to Guy David, Sara Markowitz, Ellen R. Meara, and Nirav Mehta for
helpful comments, and to the National Bureau of Economic Research for data access
and computer facilities.
Claire, my wife, has sustained me throughout this process. Her intellectual and
emotional support kept me moving forward over the many months, as she generously
accommodated a partner full of stresses and anxieties. I am grateful for the morning
coffee and all the dinners, the listening and critiquing, and especially her sacrifice of
time and energy that made this work possible.
This research uses data from Add Health, a program project designed by J.
Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris, and funded by a grant
P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 17 other agencies. Spe-
cial acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance
in the original design. Persons interested in obtaining data files from Add Health
should contact Add Health, Carolina Population Center, 123 W. Franklin Street,
Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524 (addhealth@unc.edu). No direct support was received
from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
iii
ABSTRACT
PEER EFFECTS IN SEXUAL INITIATION:
SEPARATING SOCIAL NORMS AND PARTNER SUPPLY
Seth O. Richards
Kenneth I. Wolpin
Sexual activity among adolescents is associated with risks such as pregnancy and
STDs, and there is substantial policy interest in how peers influence the timing of
sexual initiation. This paper measures separate effects for two social mechanisms—
peer-group norms and partner availability—using a national sample of high school
students. I develop and estimate an equilibrium search and matching model for first
sexual encounters that specifies distinct roles for the two mechanisms. Norms are
defined based on the share of nonvirgins among same-gender peers, which influences
whether an individual searches for a sexual partner. Supply is modeled with an
arrival rate for partners, which depends on the search behavior among the opposite
gender. The model produces a discrete-time duration to first sex which I estimate with
quarterly data on individual virginity status constructed from the Add Health study.
The endogeneity of peer behavior with respect to individual behavior is addressed with
a combination of strategies. First, I use standard instrumental variables methods to
estimate linear regressions for virginity status at the end of each grade. Instruments
for group nonvirginity rates are person-specific characteristics such as sibling structure
and age of menarche, and the regressions include school-by-grade fixed effects. This
analysis demonstrates that school-based social interactions have a large effect on
sexual initiation. Second, I estimate the search and matching model via simulated
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maximum likelihood, in order to decompose this composite effect into separate effects
of peer norms and partner availability. Here I control for the endogeneity of peer
behavior by (a) defining the norm effect as a function of lagged peer outcomes, (b)
including a random effect that is correlated within schools, and (c) using exogenous
peer characteristics as supply shifters. I find that peer-group norms have a large effect
on the timing of sexual initiation: removing the peer influence on search decisions,
42% fewer boys and 22% fewer girls become sexually active in ninth or tenth grade.
Changes in the availability of partners at school (i.e., changes in opposite-gender
search behavior) also have a large impact on initiation rates for boys, although not
for girls.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
About one-half of the students in grades nine through twelve in the United States
are sexually experienced.1 Sexual activity begins at young ages, with 14.6 percent
of boys and 13.0 percent of girls initiating before age 15, and even higher rates in
certain subgroups.2 The prevalence of sexual activity among adolescents raises sub-
stantial concerns, largely because of associated risks such as unplanned pregnancy
and sexually transmitted disease.
The initiation of sex is a significant event in itself due to the persistence of sex-
ual activity once started (Arcidiacono, Khwaja, and Ouyang, 2009). A variety of
interventions that attempt to delay first sex have been proposed and implemented.
Drawing on evidence in psychology and sociology that adolescents are strongly in-
fluenced by peer norms, many interventions include an educational program against
group norms that promote sex.3 Another policy targeting a social mechanism is to
restrict the supply of partners, who are often met at school. Single-sex schools rep-
1Sex is defined as sexual intercourse. This figure comes from the the Youth Risk Behavior Survey.
2For example, among non-Hispanic blacks 29% of boys and 23% of girls report sexual intercourse
before age 15 (published data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth).
3Manlove, Romano-Papillo, and Ikramullah (2004) describe several interventions that explicitly
target social norms or so-called “peer pressure.”
1
resent one way to do this, but a less drastic option is to isolate ninth grade from the
older grades in high school.4
Existing econometric work has found large peer effects in adolescent risk behav-
iors including sexual initiation (Fletcher, 2007), as well as criminal activity, high
school completion, substance abuse, and obesity (Case and Katz, 1991; Gaviria and
Raphael, 2001; Lundborg, 2006; Clark and Lohe´ac, 2007; Trogdon, Nonnemaker, and
Pais, 2008). These results suggest that some kind of intervention targeting social
interactions would be effective. However the methods used in these studies cannot
distinguish among the different mechanisms that are relevant to interventions such as
the two above, because what they measure is a composite effect of social interactions.
This effect is defined as the change in the probability of an outcome for an individual
caused by a change in the distribution of that outcome (usually the mean) among
some reference group. Such an effect can result from many underlying mechanisms,
whereas the effectiveness of an intervention depends on the particular mechanism it
targets. This is especially important in the case of sexual initiation because there are
(at least) two plausible social mechanisms: social norms among peers and the supply
of partners at school. The assessment of these mechanisms is complicated because the
level of sexual activity among peers could have both a direct effect on an individual’s
desire to have sex and an indirect effect via the availability of partners in equilibrium.
In this paper, I apply a model for sexual initiation that provides distinct roles
for peer norms and partner availability, in order to measure separate effects for these
two mechanisms. This responds to suggestions by Manski (2000), writing on social
interactions, and Gruber (2001), writing on youth risk behaviors, to integrate formal
economic models with empirical work in order to clarify mechanisms. The starting
point for my model is to consider a market for sexual partners defined within the
4In fact, some school districts keep the ninth grade in middle school.
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student body at a high school. The demand from each individual depends on the
expected costs and benefits of sex, which is influenced by the share of same-gender
peers who are nonvirgins. I use a search and matching framework, so this “demand”
is modeled as the decision to search for a sexual partner. The probability of finding
a partner then depends on the search decisions of others. Thus, the effect of partner
availability appears through the changes in the probability of finding a partner due to
changes in the search behavior among the opposite gender. Peer norms, on the other
hand, affect preferences—i.e., the expected utility of sex that determines the search
decision—where “peers” are defined as persons of the same gender, and “norms”
is a reasonable interpretation for the influence of peer-group nonvirginity rates on
individual tastes.
The empirical analysis has two complementary components. First I estimate the
composite effect of social interactions at school using an instrumental variables (IV)
method that is standard in this literature. I am able to improve on the existing work
on sexual initiation because the data allow me to estimate an effect on virginity status
at each grade, and to include school-by-grade fixed effects. Then, having established
the presence of a composite effect in my data using standard methods, I structurally
estimate the search and matching model to measure separate effects for peer norms
and partner availability. This estimation uses simulated maximum likelihood.
The data come from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add
Health), which provides a nationally representative sample of U.S. high school stu-
dents in the mid-1990s. I follow 14,300 students over two years using retrospective
sexual histories taken in two rounds of interviews. The observation of virginity status
over time allows the search and matching model to be estimated as a dynamic process,
and it makes possible an innovative econometric strategy to identify the endogenous
effects of social interactions.
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The results indicate that peer norms have a large effect on the timing of sexual
initiation for both boys and girls. In a counterfactual simulation that removes the
peer influence on search decisions, the share of individuals who initiate sex during
ninth or tenth grade falls by 0.08 (42% of the total) for boys and 0.06 (22%) for girls.
Changes in the availability of partners at school also impact the initiation rate for
boys, but are not statistically significant for girls. The effect on boys is large: for
example, a one-standard-deviation increase in the share of girls searching for a sexual
partner raises the probability of finding a partner each period by 18% for boys in the
tenth grade. Overall, these results are consistent with the IV estimation, which finds
large composite effects of social interactions.
Policy simulations show that an educational intervention reducing the influence
of peer norms would have a larger impact than isolating the ninth grade from older
grades to restrict the supply of partners. A program cutting the measured effects of
peer norms in half would decrease sexual initiation during the ninth and tenth grades
by 27 percent for boys and by 12 percent for girls. On the other hand, removing
the ninth grade from high school would decrease initiation in that year by about 13
percent for both boys and girls, but the effect dissipates over time.
In addition to measuring separate effects for peer norms and partner availability
in adolescent sexual initiation, this work relates to the broader empirical literature
on social interactions where the endogeneity of peer behavior is a central problem for
estimation. In an overview of this literature, Moffit (2001) describes three conceptu-
ally distinct sources of endogeneity bias: the simultaneity of observed actions, which
Manski (1993) calls the “reflection” problem; the correlation of omitted variables
among peers; and selection into peer groups.
The most common strategy to address these problems is to use instrumental vari-
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ables (IV) to provide exogenous variation in peer behavior.5 Typically, instruments
are person-specific characteristics hypothesized not to have a direct effect on the out-
comes of others. However, the exclusion restrictions assumed for identification are
violated if the distribution of these characteristics among peers has a direct effect
on the individual, sometimes called a “contextual” effect (Manski, 1993; Brock and
Durlauf, 2001). This can occur if, for example, peers are defined spatially, and mean
peer characteristics (especially socioeconomic attributes) relate to local factors that
are unobserved. The use of school-by-grade fixed effects in my IV estimation is thus
important to remove any such contextual effects that are time-invariant. This strat-
egy, which identifies an effect of social interactions using differences between cohorts
that pass through the same grade, is relatively novel in economic work on adolescent
risk behaviors.
Apart from IV methods, several recent papers use longitudinal data to address the
multiple sources of endogeneity.6 De Paula (2009) presents a nonparametric test for
social interactions based on the simultaneous occurrence of outcomes among peers.
Alternatively, if social interactions take time to have an effect, the use of lagged peer
outcomes can remove the simultaneity problem (Manski, 1993). However unlike stan-
dard models, serial correlation in the individual errors would lead to biased estimates
in such models. This is because lagged peer outcomes are themselves affected by the
individual’s behavior in an earlier period.7 To account for this and the other sources
of endogeneity, some recent papers take advantage of data where individuals appear
5For example, among the econometric papers on adolescent risk behaviors referenced earlier, all
use IV except for Clark and Lohe´ac (2007).
6The literature includes other methods that do not rely on longitudinal data. Evans, Oates, and
Schwab (1992) and Krauth (2006) assume a multivariate normal distribution for the errors and use
this to correct for selection or to allow for correlated unobservables (with additional assumptions).
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) assume a specific network structure for individual in-
teractions, which allows them to recover a peer effect from excess variance in aggregate outcomes.
Sacerdote (2001) and Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) use random assignment to peer groups.
7Clark and Lohe´ac (2007) argue that serial correlation is not important in their setting.
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in multiple peer groups by including individual fixed effects (Hanushek et al., 2003;
Mas and Moretti, 2009; Arcidiacono, Foster, and Kinsler, 2009; Jackson and Brueg-
mann, 2009). This strategy removes any permanent component of the unobservable,
which addresses endogeneity bias due to both serial correlation in the individual er-
rors and any common omitted variables among peers—assuming these factors are
time-invariant.
In my structural estimation, I use similar strategies based on longitudinal data.
First, I specify the peer influence on preferences to be a function of lagged peer
outcomes. This removes the problem of simultaneity, and it is consistent with the
development of social norms over time rather than jointly occurring opportunities to
have sex. Then to account for serial correlation in the individual errors, the model
includes a random effect as a permanent component of preferences. The distribution
of this random effect depends on individual characteristics, and on the shares of non-
virgins in each grade at the time when the individual enters high school (to capture
initial conditions). This produces a correlation in the unobservable among peers,
which addresses correlated omitted variables that are time-invariant. The combina-
tion of these two strategies—the use of lagged peer outcomes and a random effect
that is correlated among peers—is novel in the literature on social interactions, and
it enables me to exploit time-series variation in data where individuals do not appear
in multiple peer groups.
There are two further strategies that do not rely on longitudinal data. Person-
specific characteristics among the opposite gender play a role similar to IV. They
affect preferences, so they function as exogenous predictors of search behavior (i.e.,
supply shifters). And finally, I use the grade in school to define peers, rather than an
endogenous social group like sport teams or nominated friends, in order to avoid the
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problem of peer group selection.8
Apart from the methods used to address endogeneity bias, another innovation
in this work relates to how I solve for equilibrium behavior. To determine optimal
search decisions, agents need beliefs about the shares of nonvirgins by gender and
grade in future periods because these shares affect future payoffs and arrival rates.
In order to construct equilibrium beliefs, I apply an insight from recent work on
the estimation of discrete dynamic games which uses observed outcome probabilities
directly for rational beliefs (Bajari, Benkard, and Levin, 2007; Pakes, Ostrovsky,
and Berry, 2007).9 I adapt this technique to be feasible in my context, where the
large (but finite) number of agents produces a complicated distribution of outcomes,
by approximating the evolution of nonvirginity rates as an autoregressive process.
Obtaining beliefs directly from the data in this way greatly simplifies and speeds the
estimation procedure because there is no need to solve for a new equilibrium with
each set of candidate parameters.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. The next chapter gives further
background on teenage sexual activity and summarizes existing evidence on peer and
other influences in this behavior. Chapter 3 presents the model. Chapter 4 describes
the data, and chapter 5 contains the IV analysis that demonstrates a composite effect
of social interactions. Chapter 6 describes the structural estimation procedure and
explains how the endogeneity of peer behavior is addressed in that approach. Chapter
7 gives the results from the search and matching model that measures separate effects
for peer norms and partner availability, and chapter 8 presents policy simulations and
other counterfactual experiments.
8The selection of school districts is another concern in this literature, but in my model this would
be captured by the permanent component of preferences that is correlated within schools.
9These papers build on the method originally developed for individual dynamic models by Hotz
and Miller (1993).
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Chapter 2
Background on Adolescent Sexual
Behavior in the U.S.
The national Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS), a survey of students in grades
9-12 in the United States administered every two years since 1991, shows that the
share of high school students who are sexually experienced has ranged from 46 percent
to 54 percent over the past two decades. The share decreased until 2001, and since
then has had a small but statistically insignificant increase.1 For girls the decrease
occurred mainly in younger grades, with the nonvirginity rate among ninth graders
falling from 32 percent in 1993 (the first year reported by grade) to 27 percent in 2007
while staying at 66 percent among twelfth graders. For boys the decline in sexual
experience occurred in all grades (CDC, 1995 and 2008a). The National Survey of
Family Growth (NSFG) shows simliar patterns by age rather than grade. From 1995
to 2002, nonvirginity rates among (never married) 15 to 17 year-olds decreased from
38 to 30 percent for girls and from 43 to 31 percent for boys. The rate among 18 and
1CDC fact sheet on “Trends in the Prevalence of Sexual Behaviors, National YRBS: 1991-2007,”
http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/yrbs/pdf/yrbs07_us_sexual_behaviors_trend.pdf,
accessed 4/28/09.
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19 year-olds remained statistically unchanged at 68 percent for girls, while it dropped
from 75 to 64 percent for boys (Abma et al., 2004).
Published data from the NSFG also provide information on the frequency of sex
and number of partners for teenagers (age 15-19).2 Sexual activity is highly persistent:
only 9 percent of sexually experienced teenage boys and girls report having had sex
only once, compared with 69 (76) percent of nonvirgin boys (girls) who report having
sex in the past three months and 87 (91) percent in the past year. This persistence
indicates the importance of initiation. Moreover, the decrease in sexual experience
from 1995 to 2002 almost completely accounts for the decrease in sexual activity over
that period.3 The rates of activity and experience fell by the same relative amounts,
meaning that the probability of being active conditional on being experienced was
unchanged.4 The modal number of sexual partners per year, among sexually active
teenagers, is one: 47 (61) percent of nonvirgin boys (girls) have one partner over a
12-month period, while only 8 percent of either gender have four or more partners.
On the other hand, most individuals who become sexually active as teenagers have
more than one partner during their teenage years. Among sexually experienced 18
and 19 year-olds, 71 percent of boys and 65 percent of girls report more than one
partner in their lifetimes.
Among the risks associated with adolescent sexual behavior, the greatest attention
has gone to unplanned pregnancy. In his 1995 State of the Union address, President
Bill Clinton labeled the “epidemic” of teenage pregnancy and out-of-wedlock child-
bearing “our most serious social problem.”5 The rate of childbearing among women
2The figures that follow are calculated from data published in Abma et al. (2004).
3Sexual activity is typically defined as intercourse within the past three months.
4For boys, the rates of sexual experience and sexual activity both fell by 17%; for girls, the rate
of sexual experience fell by 8% and the rate of sexual activity fell by 9%.
5Transcript from “The American Presidency Project” website, http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=51634, accessed 11/10/09.
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aged 15-19 in the U.S. is substantially higher than in other developed nations, despite
declines from a peak in the early 1990s. Increased contraceptive use accounted for
most of this decline, but corresponding with the large drop in nonvirginity rates at
younger ages, reductions in sexual activity accounted for 23 percent of the decrease
in childbearing among girls aged 15 to 17 from 1995 to 2002 (Santelli et al., 2007).
Teenage childbearing is associated with negative outcomes for both the mothers
and their children. For example, teenage mothers have lower educational attainment,
and their sons are more likely to be incarcerated at some point in their lives (Hoffman,
2006). There are also large public expenditures on the children of teenage mothers,
such as an estimated $1.9 billion for medical care and $2.3 billion in foster care per
year (Hoffman, 2006).
Another risk associated with sexual activity is sexually transmitted disease (STD).
The prevalence of STDs is higher among teenagers and 20-24 year-olds than any
other age groups. For the two most common and well-reported STDs, chlamydia and
gonorrhea, there were nearly 480,000 cases among teenagers in 2007 (CDC, 2008b).
Considering these and six other major STDs, Chesson et al. (2004) estimate that the
lifetime medical cost of treating the amount STDs acquired over one year by 15 to
24 year-olds totals $6.5 billion.
Finally, there is work indicating possible direct effects of early sexual initiation
on psychological well-being and academic performance. Sabia (2007) and Sabia and
Rees (2008) estimate that boys who initiate sex before age 16 then have decreased
GPAs and girls who initiate before age 17 are then more likely to have symptoms of
depression, controlling for individual fixed effects.
A small literature in economics examines adolescent sexual behavior, and most
of this work considers individual-based, as opposed to social, factors. In a review,
Levine (2001) describes a process with three sequential choices: whether to have sex,
10
whether to use birth control, and then if pregnant, whether to have an abortion. He
explains that most of the work in economics at that point focused on fertility and
collapsed the three choices into a single, determinstic decision to give birth.6 Levine
(2001) then examines the effect of indirect costs associated with pregnancy and un-
protected sex, such as welfare benefits for children and the prevalence of AIDS. He
finds that statewide variations in these costs over time have an impact on sexual
activity and contraceptive use. Other recent papers have studied the relationship be-
tween substance use and sexual behavior (Rees, Argys, and Averett, 2001; Sen, 2002;
Markowitz, Kaestner, and Grossman, 2005). The evidence is mixed: for example,
Markowitz, Kaestner, and Grossman (2005) find no effect of alcohol or marijuana use
on sexual activity using individual fixed effects or IV, but they do find an effect on
condom use as well as a reduced form relationship between state alcohol policies and
STD rates.
In addition to this work, Oettinger (1999), Walker (2003), and Arcidiacono,
Khwaja, and Ouyang (2009) present models of the decisions to have sex and use con-
traception, which highlight specific aspects of these behaviors. Oettinger (1999) shows
how sex education could either increase or decrease sexual initiation by changing the
expected utility of sex and unplanned pregnancy, or changing the (real or perceived)
risk of pregnancy conditional on sex. He then estimates that sex education increases
the hazard rate of initiation for girls, controlling for common unobservables among
siblings. Walker (2003) focuses on perceived pregnancy risk, which in his model influ-
ences contraceptive effort. He presents survey data on subjective expectations which
show that most teenagers have accurate beliefs about their own risk of pregnancy,
except for sexually experienced girls in poor families, who underestimate their risk.
6Levine (2001) notes two papers that considered the impact of AIDS on condom use, although
they did not analyze teenagers.
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Arcidiacono et al. (2009) estimate a dynamic model with joint decisions on having
sex and using contraception, which includes utility terms to capture habit persistence
in sexual activity. They find large fixed and transition costs that lead to persistent
behavior.
As for social influences, Fletcher (2007) is the only econometric work estimating
an effect of social interactions on sexual activity per se. Case and Katz (1991) and
Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) estimate social effects on teenage childbearing, with
the former using average teen fertility in a neighborhood and the latter using the share
of economically disadvantaged students at school as explanatory variables.
Outside economics, large literatures in psychology and sociology analyze the role of
peer norms in adolescent behavior, and there is specific evidence on sexual initiation.
Kinsman et al. (1998), Santelli et al. (2004), and Sieving et al. (2006) measure
peer norms through self-reported individual perceptions about the level of sexual
activity among peers, peer attitudes toward sex, and the social gains for becoming
sexually active. All three studies find that norms defined this way have a significant
association with the probability of initiating sex. Moreover, this work specifically
asks for perceptions about how many peers are already sexually experienced, which
supports the use of lagged peer outcomes in my model. In addition, earlier studies
surveyed by the National Research Council (NRC) Panel on Adolescent Pregnancy
and Childbearing (1987) indicate that the relevant norms operate within gender.
Related to this area of research, many interventions to delay first sex target peer
norms. Two examples are “Safer Choices,” first implemented in 1993 with 2,000 ninth
and tenth grade students in ten high schools in California and Texas, and “Draw the
Line/Respect the Line,” (DL/RL) first implemented in 1997 with 1,500 middle school
students in California (Manlove, Romano-Papillo, and Ikramullah, 2004). These pro-
grams consist of about 20 classroom sessions spaced out over two or three school years,
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which include learning about social norms and practicing communication skills. To
give a flavor of exactly how these programs work, Session 2 in Safer Choices is de-
scribed as
The Safest Choice: Deciding Not to Have Sex. Students learn about
“social norms.” They discuss perceptions of how many of their peers have
had sex and how these perceptions compare to actual statistics. Using
role-playing, students also learn refusal skills. (p. 31)
Similarly, Session 5 in DL/RL “discusses the role that friends play in respecting the
line. Role play scenarios are used to practice showing respect for another person’s
limits” (p. 21).7
In addition to peers defined as friends, researchers have examined the influence
of siblings and romantic partners on sexual initiation. Rodgers et al. (1992), Wid-
mer (1997), and Argys, Rees, Averett, and Witoonchart (2006) give evidence that
individuals with older siblings tend to initiate sex earlier. Kaestle, Morisky, and Wi-
ley (2002) find that girls with romantic partners who are much older have a higher
probability of initiating sex.
Finally, a number of individual and parental characteristics have been shown to
predict early sexual initiation. The NRC Panel on Adolescent Pregnancy and Child-
bearing (1987, chapter 4) provides a useful overview. Black race and low socioeco-
nomic status meaured by parental education or family income are strong predictors,
although some recent research indicates the race effect is mostly among boys (Levine,
2001; Michael and Bickert, 2001). Early onset of puberty is another strong (and
plausibly exogenous) predictor, which is well measured in girls as the age of menar-
che (NRC Panel, 1987; Miller et al., 1997).
7These programs were evaluated by comparing outcomes across schools that were randomly
assigned into treatment or control groups. The results found that DL/RL reduced sexual initiation
among boys by one third but Safer Choices did not have an effect on the population as a whole,
although there was a decrease in initiation among Latinos (Manlove et al., 2004).
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Chapter 3
A Search and Matching Model for
First Sex
The model describes a discrete-time dynamic process leading to sexual initiation.
Each period, virgins decide whether or not to search for their first sexual partners.
For those who search, there is a probability of finding a partner per period which
depends on the search behavior among virgins and nonvirgins of the opposite gender.
Equilibrium is defined within a local market for partners, which is the student body at
a high school. There is also an external market, which appears through an exogenous
probability of finding a partner from outside the school.
The model abstracts from certain aspects of adolescent sexual behavior that would
add complications without greatly enhancing the analysis of social influences in sexual
initiation per se. First, there is no constraint on the number of partners per period.
Although a single partner per period is the most common, multiple partners (observed
as overlapping relationships) also appear in the data. To incorporate this in the model,
I would need to specify multiple types of relationships (exclusive and nonexclusive)
and include a dissolution rate for exclusive relationships. Then the arrival rate of
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partners would depend in part on the share of exclusive relationships, and agents
would need to keep track of this aspect of the market, which would greatly expand
the state space.
Second, payoffs relate directly to virginity status. All the costs and benefits of
sexual activity, such as the risk of pregnancy or the frequency of sex, are embedded in
the expected utility of nonvirginity. In connection to this, subsequent decisions related
to sexual activity are suppressed (e.g., contraceptive use and abortion).1 Further
decisions and additional structure in the payoffs are not necessary for my analysis
because, for a virgin, it is the overall expected utility of novirginity that determines
whether he or she wants to become sexually active.
Third, nonvirgins are assumed to stay in the market and continually search for
new partners. This allows individuals to have more than one partner during high
school, which is true for a large portion of the population. And again, it avoids the
decisions to have multiple partners or end a relationship.
Finally, the match probabilities among individuals do not depend on own or part-
ner characteristics. Including them would introduce sorting behavior, which is not
the purpose of this research. Thus the arrival rate in the model averages over any
individual heterogeneity and any differences related to the characteristics of opposite-
gender searchers. To the extent that arrival rates are in fact heterogeneous, the model
misassigns the effect of such characteristics to the search decision. However, the typ-
ical characteristics one would think to use to add heterogeneity to the arrival rate
or match probabilities are permanent attributes. In contrast, the primary objects
of interest—the effects of peer norms and partner availability—are identified from
changes in nonvirginity rates over time, not permanent attributes.
1Also, there is no decision to accept a match offer. This is not needed because all matches produce
the same payoff for an individual.
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3.1 Model Specification
The model applies to individuals, i, located in a local market for partners, m, who
have a gender, τ ∈ {b, g}.2 Virginity status at the start of a period is denoted yi,t−1,
with 0 meaning virginity. Each period virgins make a search decision dit ∈ {0, 1}, and
for those who search there is a probability of finding a partner and thereby initiating
sex. Nonvirgins always search.
Age, a, is defined socially as quarter within grade in high school. The model covers
the fall of ninth grade (a = 1) through the spring of twelfth grade (a = 15 ≡ A).
Time, t, is also measured in quarters, and is needed separately from age to track
multiple cohorts at once. However in the exposition, the model is presented from the
perspective of a reference cohort for which time and age are equal (ait = t). Also, all
functions are gender-specific, but gender subscripts are suppressed unless needed for
clarity.
The probability of finding a partner each period is expressed by the arrival rate, λit,
which is a function of the share of searchers among the opposite gender at the school.
The arrival rate does not depend on the search behavior of the same gender because
there is no a constraint on the number of partners, so there is no competition between
same-gender individuals. The share of searchers among the opposite gender at i’s
school is denoted Nit, and this includes the behavior of both virgins and nonvirgins.
Because there is also an external market for partners, even with zero searchers at
school the arrival rate is positive.
The arrival rate is given by a gender and age specific function, which is specified
as a logit:
λit = λait(Nit) ≡
exp(λ0ait + λ1Nit)
1 + exp(λ0ait + λ1Nit)
(3.1)
2The model pertains to heterosexual sex, so a partner must be of the opposite gender.
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(with subscripts τi suppressed). The main reason to allow the parameters λ0a to vary
with age is to capture changes in the amount of contact with the external market as
students progress to older grades. The key parameter of interest in (3.1) is λ1, which
gives the effect of partner availability at school.
Individuals derive utility from their virginity status. The per-period payoff for
being sexually experienced is a linear combination of age, the share of peers who are
already nonvirgins, denoted Yi,t−1, a permanent individual component, ωi, and iid
preference shocks, it. Peers are individuals of the same gender in the same grade as
i. The per-period utility for a nonvirigin is then is expressed as
u(ait, Yi,t−1, ωi, it) ≡
uit︷ ︸︸ ︷
αait + γYi,t−1 +ωi + it. (3.2)
The per-period utility for a virgin is normalized to zero.
The term γYi,t−1 represents the effect of peer norms. Stated more precisely, the
model relates lagged peer outcomes to the expected utility of sex. I interpret this as
an effect of social norms, based on the evidence from sociological work on sexual initi-
ation. The age term (αait) is intended to capture the individual maturation process,
which is both biological and psychological. The permanent individual component
(ωi) expresses aspects of the potential costs and benefits of sexual activity that vary
across individuals. For example, this captures differences in the desire for sex, as well
as differences in the costs of pregnancy and STDs, or the perceptions of these risks.
Individuals are not myopic in the model and consider future payoffs with a discount
rate β. This is supported by strong evidence of anticipation and intentionality in
sexual initiation, found by Kinsman et al. (1998). Consequently, because the model
ends with high school graduation but the payoff to virginity status continues, non-
trivial terminal values are needed. For nonvirgins, I eliminate the peer influence on
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preferences after high school (there is no further data, anyway) and hold the age
and permanent individual components constant for an infinite horizon. This yields a
simple terminal value of (αA + ωi)/(1 − β). For virgins, the terminal value is a free
parameter ν(ωi). This is nonzero to allow virgins to anticipate a payoff from sexual
activity later in life.3
I express lifetime utility using the Bellman representation, with value functions
denoted Va(yi,t−1, Yt−1, ωi, it). The vector Yt−1 (8×1) contains the shares of nonvirgins
by gender in each of the four grades in high school; this is the aggregate state of the
local market. The arguments of the value functions, along with the individual’s gender
and age, constitute the information set. Va(1, Yt−1, ωi, it) gives the expected lifetime
utility for a nonvirgin, which has an analytical expression:
u(ait, Yi,t−1, ωi, it) +
A∑
s=ait+1
βs−ait Etu(s, Yi,s−1, ωi, is) + βA−ait
αA+ ωi
1− β , (3.3)
where Et denotes the individual’s expectation given his or her information set (and
recall that ait = t for the reference cohort).
For a virgin, the value function is a more complicated object that incorporates
the search decision and the arrival rate. It is expressed as
Vait(0, Yt−1, ωi, it) = max
dit
dit Et
[
λit ·
(
uit + ωi + it + βVait+1(1, Yt, ωi, i,t+1)
)
+ (1− λit) · βVait+1(0, Yt, ωi, i,t+1)
]
+ (1− dit) βEtVait+1(0, Yt, ωi, i,t+1), (3.4)
where uit is defined in (3.2). The second line above expresses that an individual who
3Because only differences in payoffs are identified by choice behavior, the estimated ν(ω) may
capture omitted aspects of the terminal values for nonvirgins such as the expected value of any
preference interactions in the future.
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searches (dit = 1) will become a nonvirgin with probability λit and will remain a
virgin with probability (1−λit). The third line is the value of not searching, in which
case the individual advances to the next period still a virgin.
To form the expectations in (3.3) and (3.4), individuals need beliefs over the
sequence of shares of nonvirgins among peers (Yit, Yi,t+1, . . . ) and the arrival rate
(λit). In fact, beliefs over the evolution of the vector Yt (the nonvirginity rates by
gender and grade) are sufficient for both. This is because expected arrival rates can
be derived based on the decision rules for the opposite gender. The search decisions
among the opposite gender depend on their state variables (ajt, yj,t−1, Yt−1, ωj, jt).
Given Yt−1, it is possible to integrate the decision rules over the distributions of ωj
and jt, and the various possible assigments of individual virginity statuses yj,t−1 that
would correspond to the group nonvirginity rates in Yt−1. This yields a distribution
for Nit, the share of searchers, which in turn gives the distribution of λit. How I
implement this is explained in section 3.2.
I use an approximation to fully rational beliefs about the evolution of Yt, similar to
Krusell and Smith (1998) and Lee and Wolpin (2006). In the approximation the dis-
tribution of Yt given past values is Markovian, and its expected value is autoregressive
with the following specification:
E[Ykt|Yk,t−1] = ψ0k + ψ1Yk,t−1 + ψ2Y 2k,t−1 +
∑
j∈s(k)
ψ3jYj,t−1. (3.5)
Here k indicates one element of the vector (i.e., one gender-grade group), and s(k)
collects the subscripts for the opposite-gender groups, which I refer to as “supply
groups.” The vector autoregression that stacks these elements is denoted ψ(Yt−1). As
in Krusell and Smith (1998) and Lee and Wolpin (2006), this first-order autoregression
fits the true evolution of the aggregate state extremely well. There are two details in
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the implementation of these beliefs. First, because school populations are finite, the
approximation incorporates the impact of an individual’s choice and outcome on his
or her own group’s share of nonvirgins.4 Second, because the aggregate state does
not contain information on younger cohorts below high school, the nonvirginity rates
for each new cohort of ninth graders are predicted based on the previous cohort.5
Finally, the expected costs and benefits of sexual activity embodied in the per-
manent individual term ωi may relate to the probability of initiation prior to ninth
grade. Because these initiation rates vary across schools, the model must account for
initial conditions. To do this, I specify a distribution of ωi for virgins at the beginning
of ninth grade that is conditional on the vector Y0, which includes the nonvirginity
rates among rising ninth graders just before they enter high school.6 There are two
reasons to think that the distribution of ωi among virgins might not be independent
of the initial nonvirginity rates in Y0. First, if ω is correlated among peers, then a
high Yi0 (the share of nonvirgins among peers) indicates a higher ωi for the individ-
ual. Second, if ω is uncorrelated but there are common opportunities to initiate sex
prior to ninth grade, the distribution of ωi among the remaining virgins is affected by
selection.
In addition to Y0, the conditional distribution of ωi also depends on a vector of
exogenous, permanent individual characteristics, xi. This is for the empirical imple-
mentation, to incorporate observable attributes that relate to the expected costs and
benefits of sex. I specify ω to have finite support, so that ωi ∈ {ωk}κk=1, which assumes
4There is a straightforward modification to (3.5) to account for a known value of yit in Yit, with
a group of given size ni. The approximation ignores any impact on other groups.
5I use the nonvirginity rate of one cohort in the summer after ninth grade (t = 4) to predict
the rate for the new cohort in the same period. I do this by inverting the following regression for
the annual growth of nonvirginity rates during ninth grade: EYk4 = Π0 + Π1Yk0. The formula for
the prediction is then Yk′4 = Yk4/Π1 − Π0/Π1, where subscripts k′ and k denote the new and old
cohorts.
6The vector Y0 contains all grades in the summer before the reference cohort enters ninth grade,
because these nonviriginity rates are needed for the beliefs about {Yt}Tt=1.
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there are κ “types” when it comes to sexual initiation. The conditional distribution
of ωi, which is for virgins at the beginning of ninth grade, is specified as a multinomial
logit:
Pr(ωi = ω
k | Y0, xi) = pik|Y0,xi ≡
exp(pik0 + Y
′
0pi
k
1 + x
′
ipi
k
2)
1 +
∑κ
l=2 exp(pi
l
0 + Y
′
0pi
l
1 + x
′
ipi
l
2)
, (3.6)
where the parameters for the first type are normalized to zero.
3.2 Individual Behavior and Equilibrium
Given beliefs about the evolution of Yt, the individual decision problem solves much
like a single-agent dynamic problem. This simplification occurs because the current
period λit drops out from the decision rule, so there is no simultaneous game to be
solved each period. To show this result, I rearrange (3.4) to
max
dit
dit · Etλit ·
(
uit + ωi + it + βEtVt+1(1, Yt, ωi, i,t+1)− βEtVt+1(0, Yt, ωi, i,t+1)
)
+ βEtVt+1(0, Yt, ωi, i,t+1).
Because Etλit is strictly positive, the decision rule is therefore
dit = 1 iff uit + ωi + it + βEtVt+1(1, Yt, ωi, i,t+1) > βEtVt+1(0, Yt, ωi, i,t+1). (3.7)
Thus a virgin will search if and only if the value of becoming sexually active exceeds
the value of remaining a virgin.7
The age-specific value functions for virgins do not have an analytical expression,
but they can be numerically constructed by backward recursion starting from the
7It is interesting to note that the criterion would be the same in a decision about accepting an
offer to have sex. However the reason to model the decision as search rather than offer acceptance
is that search behavior produces an endogenous supply of partners.
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final period which has known terminal values. I use interpolation to approximate
these functions (Keane and Wolpin, 1994) because the state space includes an 8-
dimensional continuous vector (Yt−1). This involves evaluating the functions on a
set of points in the state space and then regressing these values on transformations
of the state variables to create very close approximations to the true functions. To
choose solution points that span the state space, I draw Yt−1 from a joint uniform
distribution and ωi from the set of values {ωk}, and sample xi and the membership
of the peer and supply groups from their joint empirical distribution.
To evaluate the value functions in (3.4) at the solution points, I need to extend
the standard procedure in order to account for the search decisions of opposite-gender
virgins, which are embedded in the arrival rate (λit). An exact calculation for the
expected arrival rate would use the decision rule in (3.7), and integrate over the
unobserved values of ωj and jt among those virgins. However, the random values
of Yt−1 in the solution points do not correspond to the observed virginity statuses of
the members of the supply groups, and there is no simple procedure to choose virgins
and nonvirgins to match Yt−1. This is because the probability of being a nonvirgin in
the model depends on the individual characteristics that affect the distribution of ω
and on the entire history of Y .
Instead, I use auxiliary regressions that relate the probability of search among
both virgins and nonvirgins in a group to the lagged nonvirginity rate for that group.
These regressions are made separately for each gender and quarterly age. To construct
the regression coefficients, I start with an initial value which allows the model to be
solved and thus generate search probabilties for the entire sample, and then iterate
with regressions of these search probabilities on the observed lagged nonvirginity
rates. This approach should well approximate the information structure specified
in the model, because the state space does not include any information about the
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opposite gender apart from their lagged nonvirginity rates in Yt−1.
To calculate the expected arrival rate (Etλit) to go into (3.4) with this approach, I
first use the appropriate age-specific regression to assign a probability of search (not
conditional on virginity status) to each person in the supply groups, based on the
value of Yk,t−1 for their group (k). Then I use a series of uniform draws to simulate
their behavior several times, which gives a number of realizations for Nit. Finally I
average over the resulting values of λ(Nit) to calculate an expected value for λit. The
remainder of the solution algorithm for the individual problem is standard.
To solve for the equilibrium, I need equilibrium beliefs about the evolution of Yt.
To construct these beliefs I estimate the autoregression ψ in (3.5) directly from the
observed aggregate data, in a preliminary stage before the estimation of the structural
parameters. As in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) and Pakes, Ostrovsky, and
Berry (2007), this method assumes only one equilibrium is observed, and it assumes
a steady state from one cohort to the next. Because I use an approximation to
rational beliefs, unlike these papers, I need to check that the estimated beliefs are
consistent with the model. I do this post-estimation by re-estimating ψ on data
simulated from the model and comparing the two sets of estimates. Also, because the
autoregression fits the observed evolution of Yt extremely well, with R
2 > 0.99, I use
a degenerate distribution at the expected values for the beliefs in the approximation.
This avoids the need to integrate over a distribution in each future period when
solving for individual behavior.
An alternative to the two-stage estimation procedure would be to solve for the
approximation ψ as a fixed point along with the structural parameters, as in Lee
and Wolpin (2006). In that paper part of the aggregate state is unobserved to the
econometrician (there is an aggregate productivity shock), so it is not possible to
estimate an approximation to rational beliefs directly from the data. Given that
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the aggregate state for my model is observed, the advantage of recovering beliefs
directly from the data is that it avoids the iteration needed to solve a fixed point for
each candidate set of structural paremeters. This greatly reduces the computational
burden of estimation.
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Chapter 4
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data come from Waves I and II of the National Longitudinal Study of Adoles-
cent Health (Add Health). The study contains a nationally representative sample of
students in grades 7-12 during the 1994-95 school year, when the first wave was con-
ducted. The second round of interviews (Wave II) followed up with respondents one
year later in April through August of 1996. Add Health features a highly clustered
sample drawn from 80 high schools plus additional middle schools that feed students
into the sample high schools (one middle school per high school, unless the sample
high school already includes grades seven and eight).
Add Health collects detailed retrospective histories on sexual activity and roman-
tic relationships. To enhance the sense of privacy, these questions were administered
in a self-directed portion of the survey on a laptop computer at respondents’ homes.
Included in these questions, respondents are asked if they have ever had sexual inter-
course which is defined explicitly.1 Those who say yes are then asked to report the
month of first sex. Both rounds of interviews ask these questions of all respondents,
1The question reads: “Have you ever had sexual intercourse? When we say sexual intercourse,
we mean when a male inserts his penis into a female’s vagina.” (Wave I Adolescent In-Home
Questionnaire Code Book, section 24, page 1.)
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and to minimize the loss of observations due to missing data I use the earliest month
reported in either round. From these observations I construct a quarterly series on
virginity status for each individual, starting in the summer of 1994 and ending in the
spring of 1996.
The estimation sample uses individuals observed in grades 9-12 in either the 1994-
95 or 1995-96 school years. Add Health contains 17,657 such individuals, who are in
grades 8 through 12 during the first round of interviews in 1994-95. I use the grade
in that academic year to refer to separate “cohorts.” I exclude 2,635 individuals who
drop out of the second round of interviews (except for the twelfth grade cohort, which
was not reinterviewed). I also exclude 69 individuals from an all-boys school, 98 in
schools with small samples that do not have both genders in some grades, and 318
who report homosexual sex. After dropping observations without information on key
identifying variables (school, grade cohort, and gender), the final extimation sample
contains 14,294 individuals in 78 schools.
Figure 1 presents the nonvirginity rates for this sample by quarter in high school
(i.e., “age”). Each cohort, which is observed for one or two years, is shown as a
separate line positioned over the appropriate ages. The black line then averages among
all individuals observed at a given age, to produce a complete path through high school
for a synthetic cohort. I exclude the twelfth grade cohort from the synthetic cohort
because they are interviewed only once, so they have a higher rate of missing data on
the month of first sex. This makes their retrospective nonvirginity rates fall below the
trend constructed from the younger cohorts. These graphs show that a large portion
of individuals initiate sex during high school. The share of nonvirgins among boys
increases from just over 26 percent at the beginning of ninth grade to just under 64
percent at the end of twelfth grade, and among girls it increases from 20 percent to
62 percent. Thus about 40 percent of the population initiates sex during the four
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years of high school.
Data on individual or family characteristics come from Wave I. In the structural
estimation of the search and matching model, I use indicators for black race, parental
education, and sibling status as the characteristics (xi) that affect the distribution
of the individual preference term (ωi). The education variable indicates whether one
parent has 16 years of education (i.e., is a four-year college graduate). The sibling
variables are two dummies that indicate whether the individual is a younger sibling or
is an only child. I use these variables because they are predetermined characteristics
that have been shown to predict early sexual initiation in other work, and they have
clear relationships with the expected costs or benefits of sexual activity. For example,
race and parental education relate to expected labor market outcomes, which affect
the relative cost of a pregnancy. Younger siblings may learn from older siblings
about the benefits of sex or how to reduce the costs (e.g., through birth control).
In the IV estimation of the composite effect of social interactions, I use additional
exogenous characteristics to improve the power of the instruments, and because the
computational burden of additional coefficients is negligible. These variables are
indicators for: Hispanic ethnicity; mother currently married; a foreign-born parent;
relatively high household income, defined as above $50,000; and early menarche for
girls, defined as before the median age of 12.
The shares of individuals with each of these characteristics are shown in table 1.
The table presents both the unweighted and weighted shares, and these figures are
similar except for black race, Hispanic ethnicity, and a foreign-born parent, which
reflect oversamples in the sample design. Table 1 also shows the shares of individuals
in urban school districts and in districts where the ninth grade is in a separate location
from the rest of the high school. The weighted and unweighted values for the latter
are quite different because a large number of individuals are sampled in one high
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school that only has grades 10 through 12.2 Either way, however, the vast majority
of ninth graders go to school with older students.
Table 2 shows the raw correlation between individual virginity status and the
nonvirginity rates for each gender and grade at the same school, assessed in the last
observation period (the spring quarter of the second year). Under random sampling,
these correlations are equivalent to correlations in virginity status between two indi-
viduals, one from each specified group.3 The bolded numbers along the diagonal give
the correlations within peer groups, which are somewhat higher than the correlations
with other grades of the same gender (except for girls in the tenth and twelfth grades,
who have slightly higher correlations with some other grade). This provides support
for the definition of peer groups by grade. Overall, table 2 shows there are large
correlations in virginity status within schools, about 0.2 in magnitude. This would
produce substantial variation in nonvirginity rates across schools, which is a notable
consequence of social interactions, although it can also result from unobserved factors.
For the endogenous supply of partners, only certain grades of the opposite gender
are used in the empirical implementation. These grades are shown in bold in table 2:
for boys, they are girls in the same grade, the grade below, and the grade above; and
for girls, they are boys in the same grade and the next two older grades.4 These were
chosen because, in the sexual histories, more partners are reported from these grades
than any others. The purpose of these restrictions is to incorporate the low probability
of matches between certain grades, and to create variation within schools in the shares
of nonvirgins and searchers on the supply side of the market. Partners from outside
2In-home interviews, which are the source of my data, were conducted with nearly all students
at 16 of the high schools in its sample. One of these is a large, urban high school with only grades
10-12, which is the cause of the discrepancy between weighted and unweighted figures.
3The individual is excluded from the nonvirginity rate for his or her own peer group.
4The supply groups do not need to be symmetric in the model or in reality because the lack of
constraint on the number of partners makes it possible for a small number of individuals from one
grade to match with a large number from another grade.
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these groups, such as an eleventh grade girl for a ninth grade boy or vice versa,
are considered to be exogenous, which treats them as part of the external market.
Thus in the estimation, the grade-specific constant term in the arrival function (λ0a)
captures the probability of finding a partner either from outside school or in one of
these other grades. With a few exceptions, the correlations between individuals and
their supply groups as used for estimation are larger than the correlations with the
excluded grades of the opposite gender (table 2).
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Chapter 5
Instrumental Variables Analysis
For the first empirical analysis, I apply an IV method that is standard in the literature
on peer effects. There are two purposes for this exercise. First, I am able to improve on
estimates from previous work due to the richness of my data. I can estimate an effect
of social interactions on virginity status at each grade, because virginity is assessed
over time and because the clustered sample provides a sufficient number of individuals
in each grade per school. In addition, because the data contain multiple cohorts that
pass through each grade, I am able to include school-by-grade fixed effects. This
controls for any correlated unobservables or contextual effects that are invariant over
the observation period. Other recent work on school-based social interactions in
adolescent risk behaviors also uses school fixed effects for this purpose (Lundborg,
2006; Clark and Lohe´ac, 2007; Trogdon, Nonnemaker, and Pais 2008; Fletcher, 2009).
However, except for Lundborg (2006), these papers use the same fixed effect for all
grades.1 This removes a common effect on levels but does not address differences
across schools in how risky behaviors increase with age. Yet because sexual initiation
is a one-time transition, it is natural to think of a duration process and focus on
1Lundborg (2006) defines peer groups at the classroom level and uses variations across classrooms
within grades, at a single point in time.
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how nonvirginity rates rise with age. If unobserved school-wide factors affect the
hazard rate, there will larger differences across schools at younger grades and smaller
differences at older grades. These are not captured with a single school fixed effect.
The second purpose for the IV analysis is to demonstrate the presence of social
interactions in my data using a standard method that has different identifying as-
sumptions than the structural estimation procedure. As in Fletcher (2007), which
uses a different dataset but from the same time period, the IV estimation here finds
a large composite effect of social interactions on sexual initiation.
5.1 Regression Model
The empirical models in this analysis are linear regressions for virginity status at the
spring quarter of each grade in high school. They are based on the following general
form:
yiat = pi0at + pi
′
1axi + pi2ay¯(−i)t + pi
′
3ax¯(−i) + wma + eiat, (5.1)
which is estimated separately by gender and grade (as usual, gender subscripts are
suppressed). The term pi0at is a time-specific intercept to capture differences in the
average outcomes of each cohort. The variables y¯(−i)t and x¯(−i) contain average out-
comes and characteristics of the reference group (discussed below). The school-by-
grade fixed effect is wma.
It is important to note that these regressions cannot be interpreted as approxima-
tions for the search and matching model. Seen in terms of the model, virginity status
at a point in time is the cumulative result of a transition process over many periods.
Because the per-period transition probabilities multiply out to produce the probabil-
ity of being a nonvirgin at a point in time, there is no simple correspondence between
the components of the transition process specified in the model and this cumulative
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outcome.2 In addition, the search and matching model applies to individuals who
are virgins at the beginning of high school, while the IV analysis does not condition
on initial status (this is standard). Given these differences, the baseline specification
uses contemporaneous peer outcomes in the regressions rather than lagged outcomes,
because this is the standard formulation in the literature. Regressions using lagged
outcomes produce similar results.
Another difference with the model is the use of a single reference group (this also
follows the literature); the regressions do not distinguish between a within-gender
effect and a cross-gender effect. Having separate effects in a static regression model
would be misleading because both coefficients would reflect combinations of the peer
influence on demand and the effect of partner availability. To see this, consider an
exogenous increase in the share of (same gender) peers who are sexually experienced.
This would directly increase an individual’s demand for sex. However it would also
indirectly increase the supply of partners in equilibrium because the increase in peer
nonvirginity would raise the arrival rate experienced by the opposite gender, thereby
increasing nonvirginity among the opposite gender which in turn raises the arrival
rate for the individual. This indirect effect becomes clear when followed over time:
in period 1, the nonvirginity rate among peers exogenously increases; the search
behavior of these nonvirgins then raises the arrival rate of partners for the opposite
gender, so in period 2 their nonvirginity rate increases as well; hence in period 3 both
the individual’s search probability (demand) and arrival rate (supply) are higher. In
a static framework, these effects cannot be disentangled. This is different than a
shock to supply that is common among peers, which can be addressed with proper
instruments. The difference is that both the direct effect on demand and the indirect
2To see this, suppose that the per-period transition probability for individual i is Pit. Then the
probability that i is nonvirgin at time t, conditional on being a virgin at time 0, is 1−∏ts=1(1−Pis).
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effect on supply are consequences of the exogenous increase in peer nonvirginity, due
to the equilibrium nature of the model.
To explore different sources of variation in the data, I estimate regressions with two
alternative constructions of the reference group: one is the peer group as defined in
the model, i.e., by gender and grade; the other pools the peer group with the opposite-
gender supply groups. The regression coefficient for either construction combines the
demand and supply effects contained in the model, but the exact combination would
be different for the two constructions.
To identify (5.1), I must assume that pik3a = 0 for some elements of x¯(−i); in
other words, there are valid exclusion restrictions that allow certain individual char-
acteristics to be used as instruments. I first estimate regressions that assume all of
pi3a = 0, so that the means of all characteristics among the reference group serve
as instruments. I then estimate regressions where pik3a is nonzero for socioeconomic
characteristics which are likely to have contextual effects. Here only the sibling indi-
cators and the early menarche variable are excluded. Finally, I estimate regressions
that include the school-by-grade fixed effects (wma). For these I use all the potential
instruments (pi3a = 0), in order to have as much “within” variation as possible for the
first stage. Here the effect of social interactions is identified from differences between
the mean characteristics of the two cohorts that are observed at each grade level,
which predict different group nonvirginity rates. The validity of the instruments in
this case rests on the assumption that any contextual effects they may have do not
vary over a two-year period.
I test the exclusion restrictions in these various specifications with an overidenti-
fication test. This requires that at least one element of x¯(−i) can be excluded from
(5.1), which is itself an untestable assumption.3 In the fixed-effects IV regressions,
3This test also assumes that any potential violations of the specification do not cancel each other
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this assumption pertains to the difference in mean characteristics from one year to
the next. All of the characteristics are predetermined, so it seems reasonable that
this should hold for at least one of them.
5.2 Estimates of the Composite Effect of Social
Interactions
Tables 3 and 4 present estimates of the composite effect of social interactions (also
referred to as the “social effect”) from several different specifications, using the al-
ternative exclusion restrictions and reference groups described above. Full results for
each of these specifications are contained in appendix tables A1-A4. The coefficients
reported in tables 3 and 4 give the effect of the share of nonvirgins in the reference
group on the probability that an individual is sexually experienced by the spring quar-
ter of the indicated grades. For example, in panel A, column 11, of tables 3 and 4, the
point estimates imply that a 10 percentage-point increase in the share of nonvirgins
among same-gender peers increases the probability of being sexually experienced by
7.4 percentage points for boys and 9.6 points for girls in the eleventh grade.
These results provide strong evidence of a school-based social effect on sexual
initiation for both boys and girls. Although overidentification tests indicate the ex-
clusion restrictions may be violated without fixed effects, the fixed effects estimates
also find large effects of social interactions for both genders in most grades. Also it
is interesting to note that differences in the estimates across specifications using the
same reference group—i.e., when contextual effects or school-by-grade fixed effects
are included—typically are not statistically significant.
out in the test statistic, which is possible due to the loss of degrees of freedom that results from
estimating the coefficients. See Hayashi (2000, p. 218).
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The use of school-by-grade fixed effects appears to be a successful strategy for
removing any contextual effects that would otherwise invalidate the instruments. The
overidentification tests in columns 9-12 of tables 3 and 4 have high p-values, which
indicates the instruments are properly excluded from the second stage. As expected,
the standard errors are much larger when the fixed effects are included, but there
is still enough variation in the data to yield statistically signficant results in most
grades when both constructions of the reference group are considered.4 Even with
these fixed effects the instruments retain their predictive power, as indiciated by the
first-stage F-statistics (on the instruments) which are shown in tables A1-A4. On the
other hand, adding contextual effects for mean socioeconomic characteristics among
the reference group appears to help with instrument validity for girls in some cases
(table 4, column 7 vs. column 3) but not for boys (table 3, columns 5-7).
Although the fixed effects estimates are noisy, there are suggestive differences
across grades and between boys and girls. For boys, the effect of nonvirginity rates
among peers (i.e., same gender, same grade) appears strongest in grades 10 and 11.
For girls there is no such difference across grades. When the reference group includes
the opposite gender as well as the peer group, the fixed effects estimates indicate
a larger social effect for boys than for girls, especially in grades 9 and 10. This is
interesting in light of the structural estimates, which find an effect of opposite gender
search behavior on the arrival rate for boys but not for girls.
Tables 5 and 6 show estimates of the social effect from fixed effects regressions
that only contain the smaller set of variables (race, parental education, and sibling
indicators) used in the structural estimation. Although there is no direct link between
the coefficients in these regressions and the parameters of the model, these estimates
4The estimates are particularly noisy using the combined peer and supply group, which makes
sense because the supply groups overlap for the two cohorts observed in each grade, so there is less
“within” variation in the outcomes and characteristics of the reference groups.
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demonstrate the robustness of the IV results using only the variation and controls
provided by these limited characteristics. For comparison, columns 1-4 of these tables
repeat the estimates from the full specifications (i.e., columns 9-12 of tables 3 and 4).
Columns 5-8 show results with the smaller set of variables using contemporaneous
group outcomes, and columns 9-12 show results using lagged outcomes. Both sets of
estimates are noisier than the richer specification, but still the qualitative patterns
are similar and so are the magnitudes in many cases.
Finally, because individual characteristics have different associations with sexual
initiation depending on gender, one might think of using separate variables for the
mean characteristics of boys and girls as instruments. However, the mean charac-
teristics of boys and girls at a school are highly correlated, which can be a problem
for estimation. Appendix table A5 shows that the estimated social effects using the
combined peer and supply groups instrumented in this way are similar to those instru-
mented with a single mean for each characteristic (as in panel B of tables 3 and 4).
But in results not shown, the gender-specific instruments often have opposite signs
and relatively large magnitudes in the first stage, which indicates a multicollinearity
problem.
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Chapter 6
Structural Estimation
I use simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the search and matching model.
The model produces a discrete-time duration to first sex; accordingly, the likelihood
contributions have a general form that is common for duration analysis. The search
decisions of virgins are unobserved, so the per-period transition probability is given
by the product of the probabilities of searching and finding a partner. The likelihood
function also contains observations on nonvirgins, which takes advantage of data on
the arrival of subsequent partners in order to improve the estimation of the arrival
rate.
6.1 Likelihood Function
The likelihood contributions for virgins express the probability for the observed du-
rations to first sex. They take the form of a finite mixture, because the permanent
component of preferences, ω, has a discrete distribution. Conditional on ω, the per-
period transition probability is the product of the arrival rate and the probability
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that the decision rule in (3.7) is satisfied.1 With  distributed as a standard normal,
its CDF denoted Φ, this product is
Lit(ω) ≡ Φ [uit + ω + βEtVait+1(1, Yt, ω, i,t+1)− βEtVait+1(0, Yt, ω, i,t+1)]
·
∫
λait(Nit) f(Nit) dNit. (6.1)
The solution to the model for a particular set of parameters provides the expected
future values of virginity and nonvirginity inside Φ, so the value of this probability
can be calculated. Simulation is needed for the arrival rate, in order to integrate over
the unobserved search decisions of opposite-gender virgins which generate Nit.
For an individual who initiates sex in period t∗i , the type-specific probability for
the observed duration is
Li(ω) ≡ Lit∗i (ω) ·
t∗i−1∏
t=1
[1− Lit(ω)]. (6.2)
Finally, the likelihood contribution for the duration to first sex is the combination of
these type-specific probabilities, weighted by the probability of each type given initial
conditions:
Li ≡
κ∑
k=1
pik|Ym0,xiLi(ω
k). (6.3)
For individuals who are not observed to initiate sex, there is a standard modification
to (6.2).
I use simulation to construct the expected arrival rate in (6.1), because the search
decisions of virgins in the supply groups are unobserved and depend on individual
shocks. For each simulation round, r ∈ 1 . . . R, I simulate a search decision, drjt, for
each virgin, j, in the three supply groups. This proceeds by drawing ωrj from the
1The transition probablity factors in this way because the remaining unobservable in the search
decision is the iid preference shock it.
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appropriate distribution and then comparing the type-specific search probability for
individual j, given by Φ[. . . ] in (6.1), against a pseudorandom uniform draw. Com-
bining these simulated search decisions of virgins with the known search behavior of
nonvirgins (i.e., they all search) yields N rit. Then averaging λait(N
r
it) across simulation
rounds produces an approximation for the expected arrival rate.
In addition to the likelihood contributions for the durations to first sex, the likeli-
hood function contains individual contributions from nonvirgins in order to improve
the estimation of the arrival rate parameters λ0 and λ1. This draws on data from the
sexual histories reporting when sex first occurred with each partner. The use of non-
virgins exploits the fact that, in the model, they search every period, so the arrival of
subsequent sexual partners after the first one directly identifies the raw arrival rate.
To limit departures from model, specifically the assumption that partner arrival
rates are the same for virgins and nonvirgins, I only use the arrival of second partners
for this purpose. The estimated arrival parameters will be biased to the extent that
arrival rates of second partners differ from arrival rates of first partners, and this bias
could go in either direction. Exclusivity in relationships would reduce the arrival rate
of second partners because individuals do not immediately continue to search once
they have a first partner. On the other hand, learning how to meet partners would
increase the arrival rate. Any bias is partially mitigated, however, because the arrival
rate function also appears in the likelihood contributions for the durations to first
sex, which use the arrival of the first sexual partner.
To construct a likelihood contribution for the arrival of second partners, I define
zit to indicate that sex with a second partner has been reported in the current or
some previous period. Then the contribution can be expressed as
Ai ≡
T∏
t=1
({
(1− E[λait(Nit)])1−zit E[λait(Nit)]zit
}1−zi,t−1)yit
. (6.4)
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The terms inside the curly brackets give the probability for a discrete-time duration,
and they only affect the value of the expression from the first period when yit = 1
(first partner) through the first period when zit = 1 (second partner).
2 I restrict to
individuals with yi0 = 0 (initial virgins) in order to observe the beginning of these
spells.
Finally, because the arrival of each partner is an independent event and is in-
dependent of individual characteristics, the likelihood contributions in (6.4) simply
multiply with the likelihood contributions in (6.3). Thus the complete log-likelihood
function is
∑
i log(Li) +
∑
i log(Ai), using individuals who are virgins at t = 0.
For the standard errors, I use the asymptotic distribution of a standard maximum
likelihood estimator. This assumes that the number of simulations for the expected
arrival rates grows fast enough with the sample size (Gourie´roux and Monfort, 1996).
The variance approximation is calculated via numerical differentiation of the individ-
ual likelihood contributions.
6.2 The Endogeneity of Peer Behavior
The structural estimation strategy addresses the multiple potential sources of endo-
geneity of peer behavior as follows. First, the use of lagged peer outcomes in the
search decision removes the simultaneity problem. This addresses simultaneity both
among same-gender peers and between genders; for the latter, it is because the ar-
rival rate is determined by opposite-gender search behavior, which is also a function
of lagged outcomes. Second, the presence of a permanent unobservable (ω) addresses
the problem with serial correlation in the unobservable that arises in a dynamic model
of social interactions. Third, ω is correlated within schools, which controls for corre-
2The first period when sex occurred with the first partner is included in the duration to the
second partner because multiple partners are possible per period.
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lated omitted variables that are time invariant. This combination of lagged outcomes
and a permanent unobservable that is correlated among peers, while natural for a
dynamic model, appears to be novel in the literature on peer effects. Finally, the
definition of peer groups is intended to avoid selection bias. Peer groups are defined
by grade, and it seems unlikely that individuals would systematically skip or repeat
grades in order to affect their chances of sexual initiation.
Under this strategy, the variation used to identify the peer influence on search
decisions comes from differences in Yit across peer groups conditional on Ym0. Two
groups with the same Y0 would have the same distribution of ω for their members
(controlling for individual characteristics), but then different values of Yit in later
periods would produce different search probabilities. Thus the strategy directly uses
the kind of variation that motivates interest in social interactions—the magnification
of small differences given similar initial conditions. This variation also identifies the
effect of partner availability, because the arrival rate depends largely on the shares
of nonvirgins among the opposite gender (i.e., the opposite gender elements of the
vector Ymt).
3
6.3 Left-Censored Observations
Although the start of the duration period is known (i.e., birth), the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity presents a problem when individuals are first observed after
ninth grade. The problem is that individuals who are still virgins in later grades are
more likely to have low values of ω compared with virgins at the beginning of high
3The current implementation uses only three elements of Ym0 to condition the distribution of ω:
the ninth, tenth, and eleventh grade shares for the individual’s own gender. This restriction is useful
to reduce the number of parameters and to avoid using too many highly correlated variables. But
given the argument above, a revised implementation will add the ninth grade share for the opposite
gender.
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school. The estimation procedure needs to account for this, or else the duration
dependence captured by the age parameter α would have a negative bias. Moreover,
because the hazard rate is a function of time-varying arguments, there is not a simple
way to integrate over the unobserved periods.
To update the distribution of ω for a virgin who is first observed after ninth grade,
I create approximate, type-specific hazard rates and use these to calculate the prob-
ability, for each type, of being a virgin when the individual is first observed. These
rates are approximated with data from the younger cohorts at the individual’s school,
which relies on a steady state from one cohort to the next.4 To make the approxi-
mation, I regress the type-specific transition probabilties from the likelihood function
(Lit(ω)) on relevant state variables which include the lagged shares of nonvirgins by
gender and grade (Ym,t−1). I then use these regressions to predict type-specific haz-
ard rates for the individual before the observation period, when he or she was in a
younger grade in high school. For these predictions, the current nonvirginity rates
among younger cohorts substitute for the unobserved rates among older cohorts in
previous years. The predicted hazard rates yield the probability of remaining a virgin
for each type, and I can then use Bayes Rule to update the initial distribution of ω
for the individual.
The exact procedure is:
i) Regress Lit(ω) on Ym,t−1 and x¯s(i), with separate approximations for each gender
and age (i.e., quarter within grade).
ii) Project Ym0 forward using the approximation ψ, to create a sequence as long as
the unobserved time span. For example, for someone first observed at the beginning
of eleventh grade, Ym0 would be projected for two years (eight periods).
4The steady state assumption appears elsewhere, notably in the use of an aggregate law of motion
estimated from current data to function as beliefs about the future.
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iii) Predict L̂it(ω) for the unobserved periods using the regressions from step (i),
with this generated sequence substituting for Ymt, t < 1.
iv) Define the approximate, type-specific probabilities of still being a virgin in the
initial observation period as
P̂ 0i (ω) ≡
0∏
t=1−ai0
[1− L̂it(ω)].
v) Finally, update the individual’s type distribution with
Pr(ωi = ω
k | Ym0, xi, ai0, yi0 = 0) = P̂
0
i (ω
k)∑κ
l=1 P̂
0
i (ω
l)
pik|Ym0,xi .
The circularity in this procedure is resolved by starting with some initial guess for
the regressions that produce L̂ and then iterating. In practice, these approximations
converge very quickly (within three iterations).
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Chapter 7
Results from the Search and
Matching Model
The estimated model fits the observed patterns in sexual intiation, and it finds mean-
ingful differences between the two mechanisms of peer norms and partner availability.
Figure 2 compares the observed growth of nonvirginity rates for a synthetic cohort
(“8-11 observed”) against predictions from the model. The predicted line (“9 pre-
dicted”) shows the ninth grade cohort projected to the end of senior year. This
prediction is formed by starting with observed virginity status in the initial time pe-
riod (the summer before the ninth grade cohort entered high school, 1994Q3), and
then simulating the outcomes for virgins in all cohorts going forward. Thus by the
time the ninth grade cohort reaches the end of high school, the prediction is fifteen
periods out from the observed data. This forward projection fits the observed non-
virginity rates of older cohorts in upper grades, which indicates the successful use of
multiple, overlapping cohorts to estimate a complete path through high school.
The structural parameters are shown in table 7. The effect of lagged peer non-
virginity rates on expected utility, γ, is large and strongly significant for boys. For
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girls this parameter is about two-thirds as large, and is marginally significant with
a z-statistic of 1.57 (p-value = 0.12). The age parameter, α, has the opposite pat-
tern for boys and girls. This suggests that girls are more influenced by individual
development than by peer interactions, relative to boys.
The effect of opposite-gender search behavior on the arrival rate is shown by the
parameters λ1 = (λ11, λ12, λ13). There is one parameter for each of the three grades
that provide the endogenous supply of partners for an individual, as explained in
chapter 4. These three parameters are jointly significant for boys (chi-square, 3 d.f.
= 10.4, p-value = 0.02), but not for girls. For boys the estimated effect of opposite-
gender search behavior is largest from girls in the same grade, while for girls the effect
is twice as large from boys who are two years older compared with boys in the same
grade, although these differences are not well measured.
Finally, two permanent types are sufficient to fit the observed growth of nonvir-
ginity rates during high school, as well as differences in the age trends along various
observable characteristics (not shown).1 I refer to these as “low” and “high” types.
Both types have negative values for ω, although the difference from zero is not statis-
tically significant for the high type. These parameters indicate similar expected costs
and benefits of sex for boys and girls: the chi-squared test statistics (1 d.f.) for the
gender differences in ωL and ωH are 0.04 and 0.15 respectively, with p-values above
50%. The type-specific terminal values for virgins, ν(ω), are poorly measured, which
is not surprising given the simple linear growth in nonvirginity rates.
To provide better interpretation for the estimated model, tables 8 and 9 present
average search decisions and arrival rates by gender and grade, as well as the marginal
effects of lagged peer nonvirginity rates on search probabilities (in table 8) and of
1Arcidiacono et al. (2009) also find that two types are sufficient in their work on adolescent
sexual behavior.
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current supply group search behavior on arrival rates (in table 9). Table 8 pertains
to the search decisions by virgins. For both boys and girls, the average probability of
search for low types is fairly small in ninth grade (about 0.15) but increases throughout
high school to about 0.5 in twelfth grade. High types start in ninth grade with about
a 0.5 and 0.7 probability of search, respectively, for boys and girls, and this increases
more for girls than boys as individuals age. High-type girls who are still virgins in
the twelfth grade are very likely to be searching, according to the model. Averaging
between the two types, weighted by the probability of being each type, the probability
of search among virgins is between 6 and 9 percentage points higher for girls than for
boys, depending on the grade. This fits with the faster growth in nonvirginity rates
among girls during high school.
At each grade, the marginal effect of lagged nonvirginity rates among peers is
about double for boys what it is for girls. These marginal effects are substantial in
relation to the average search probabilities, especially in younger grades. For example,
they imply that an increase of one standard deviation (about 0.17) in the nonvirginity
rate among peers would raise the probability of search by 0.07 (0.04) for boys (girls)
in the ninth grade, which is 21% (10%) of the average search probability in that grade.
Table 9 shows that the arrival rate of partners is similar for boys and girls and
is fairly constant across grades. Because the constant term λ0 varies by grade, the
arrival rate does not automatically increase over time even though nonvirginity rates
do. Also, not all grades have three supply groups available at school; for example,
there are no older groups for twelfth graders. The average arrival rate is about 0.1,
which corresponds to an expected wait of 10 periods or 2.5 years to find a partner.
The marginal effects of search behavior among the opposite gender are listed
for each of the supply groups present. Compared with the marginal effect of peer
outcomes on search decisions, the raw marginal effects here are an order of magnitude
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smaller for boys. Still, the combined effect of search behavior among the supply
groups can be large. For example, an increase of one standard deviation in the search
behavior within each of the three supply groups raises the arrival rate of partners
for a tenth grade boy by 0.02, or 18% of the average rate. For girls, the underlying
parameters are not statistically significant so the marginal effects may only reflect
sampling noise.
Table 10a shows the probability of being high type among individuals who are
virgins at the beginning of each grade. The share of high types among the remaining
virgins decreases with grade because high types are more likely to initiate sex, leav-
ing more low types among the uninitiated. Table 10b gives the average change in the
probability of being high type attributable to each of the four permanent character-
istics used in the estimation. This is calculated among virgins at the start of ninth
grade, which is the population for which the conditional distribution of ω is specified.
Each row shows the difference in the high-type probability (piH|Ym0,xi) produced by
changing the designated indicator variable from 0 to 1, with all the other variables
kept as they are observed, and averaged over this sample. These “effects” are quali-
tiatively similar to the coefficients on these variables estimated in the IV analysis
(shown in appendix tables A1-A4).
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Chapter 8
Policy Simulations and Other
Counterfactuals
Figures 3 through 8 present the results of policy simulations and other counterfactuals
that demonstrate features of the model. Each figure has two graphs, for boys and
girls, and each graph shows two projections for the ninth grade cohort: the first uses
the estimated model, exactly as in figure 2 (“9 predicted”); the second uses the model
with some modification to produce the simulation (“9 simulated”). For reference, the
gray line in these graphs (“8-11 observed”) shows the observed nonvirginity rates for
the synthetic cohort, but the relevant comparisons are between the estimated model
and the simulations.
For each counterfactual, equilibrium beliefs must be revised in order to be con-
sistent with the modified model. I do this by estimating the approximation ψ on
data simulated from the modified model, and then simulating new data with the new
beliefs. I iterate until the parameters in the beliefs approximation converge, which
usually occurs in fewer than 10 iterations.
The counterfactuals in figures 3 and 4 function as decompositions, to demonstrate
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the overall impact of peer-group norms and partner availability on sexual initiation
during high school. Figure 3 eliminates the effect of peer norms by setting γ = 0.
The results indicate that the effect of peer norms on the timing of sexual initiation is
about twice as large for boys as for girls, throughout high school. Also, norms have
a larger relative impact in younger grades: in the simulation, the share of individuals
who initiate sex in ninth or tenth grade falls by 0.08 (42% of the total) for boys and
0.06 (22%) for girls, while the share who initiate at any point during high school falls
by 0.09 (24%) for boys and 0.06 (13%) for girls.
Figure 4 eliminates the effect of opposite-gender search behavior on the arrival
rate, by setting λ1 = 0. This is purely a decomposition, because individuals would
likely compensate for the absence of available partners at school by increasing their
search efforts elsewhere. The simulation shows that changes in the search behavior
of boys at school have very little effect on the initiation rate for girls, while the
availability of girls at school does impact boys. Without any girls at their schools
who are looking for sexual partners (and without any compensating behavior), the
share of boys who become sexually active during high school is reduced by one third.
Figure 5 simulates an educational program that cuts the effect of peer norms in
half, by replacing the estimated γ with γ/2. This is intended to predict the impact
of interventions against peer pressure, such as the two described in chapter 2, on a
national population. The simulated program affects both boys and girls. Hence the
reductions in sexual initiation incorporate both the decrease in demand for sexual
partners that is directely due to the diminished peer influence, and the decrease in
supply that is an equilibrium effect of the change in the strength of peer norms among
the opposite gender. The simulated program has a larger relative impact in younger
years, decreasing sexual initiation during the ninth and tenth grades by 27% for boys
and 12% for girls.
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Figures 6 simulates isolating the ninth grade from the rest of high school. In
the model, this is accomplished by setting the parameters for older supply groups in
the arrival rate to zero for ninth graders (i.e., λg12, λg13, and λb13) and setting the
parameter for the younger supply group to zero for tenth grade boys (λb12). This
intervention decreases initiation in the ninth grade by about 13% for both boys and
girls, although the impact on girls is based on poorly measured parameters. The effect
dissipates rapidly for girls, but it persists somewhat for boys due to the additional
effect on tenth graders and the stronger peer influence among boys that multiplies
the initial policy impact.
Figure 7 presents a simulation that removes all the nonvirgins from high school
(in all grades) when the ninth grade cohort enters. This is intended to show the
importance of initial conditions, both within a peer group and from the supply groups.
The excluded nonvirgins are still counted toward the simulated nonvirginity rates
presented in the graphs, so the basis for comparison is the same. The results looks
similar to the simulation with the peer influence cut in half, in figure 5, and in fact
the effect of removing nonvirgins works mostly within peer groups. Simulations that
remove only the nonvirgins of one gender (not shown) indicate little effect on the
opposite gender. This is probably due to the fact that the arrival rate is a function
of the share of searchers among the opposite gender, and the share of virgins who
search at the beginning of high school is reasonably large (see table 8).
Figure 8 simulates the effect of “virginity pledges” on non-pledgers.1 This works by
setting the value of ωL (for low types) to a sufficiently negative value so that low-type
individuals have a negligible probability of search.2 These individuals represent the
1See Bearman and Bruckner (2001) or Rosenbaum (2009) for evidence on the outcomes of pledgers
themselves.
2A value of -1 is sufficient to keep the search probability below 0.01 through the end of high
school.
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pledgers. The graphs show the nonvirginity rates among high-type individuals, who
represent non-pledgers. The population in these graphs is restricted to individuals
who are virgins at the start of high school, because total nonvirginity rates are not a
good basis for comparison given that low-type individuals do not initiate sex. There
is little effect on high-type girls, because they have such a high probability of search
in the estimated model (see table 8), and the supply of boys has little effect on their
initiation rates (see figure 4). For high-type boys on the other hand, the amount
of initiation during high school is reduced by 10%. This is an effect of both smaller
nonvirginity rates among peers and a smaller share of searchers among girls at school.
Of course, to the extent that pledgers and non-pledgers are not peers or potential
partners for each other, this overstates the spillover effects of virginity pledges.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
In two separate analyses with different identifying assumptions, I find evidence that
social interactions in high school have large effects on sexual initiation. This is in line
with results from other work on peer effects in adolescent risk behaviors, including
earlier evidence on sexual initiation. The magnitude of the composite effect of school-
based social interactions is large: at some grade levels in high school, the estimated
effect size is close to 1 or even above it. This means that an increase in the share of
nonvirgins among an individual’s reference group raises his or her probability of being
nonvirgin by an equivalent amount, which represents a large multiplier individual
behavior. Although this composite effect is estimated with linear regressions, this
suggests the possibility of a nonlinear “tipping point,” in which small changes in
initial conditions or small shocks can lead to large differences across schools.
By applying an economic model of the underlying process, I am able to decom-
pose the composite effect and provide an assessment of two distinct social mechanisms.
This improves our understanding of adolescent sexual behavior, and it is useful for
policy because the mechanisms—social norms among peers and the supply of part-
ners at school—are susceptible to different interventions. The results indicate that
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programs counteracting peer norms that promote sexual activity have more poten-
tial to delay sexual initiation than do policies separating younger grades from older
grades. In addition, boys appear to be more sensitive than girls to the social mecha-
nisms studied in this work, which suggests designing interventions that are targeted
to boys.
This work could be extended in a number of ways. First, it would be valuable to
conduct the two empirical analyses on middle school students. Although the number
of individuals who are sexually active at these ages is smaller, there is much policy
concern about sexual initiation before the ninth grade. In addition, work in sociology
indicates that peer norms have a large effect at these ages. The data in the Add
Health study could be sufficient for this extension, although the sample sizes are
smaller and the grade structure of middle schools is more variable which complicates
the definition of the market for partners.
Second, future work would benefit from data over time on subjective perceptions
of peer sexual behavior and reported intentions to initiate sex.1 The analysis in this
paper assumes that individuals have accurate beliefs about the shares of nonvirgins
among their peers. However some survey evidence indicates that adolescents overesti-
mate the share of peers who are sexually active (National Campaign to Prevent Teen
Pregnancy, 2004), and it would be interesting to see how beliefs relate to the actual
behavior of peers. Reported intentions to initiate sex, if reliable, could be used as
observed search decisions. This would make it easier to include heterogeneity in the
arrival rate, and to allow for possible competition for partners between individuals of
the same gender.
1Add Health contains questions on the components of an ideal romantic relationship, which
indicate whether the individual wants to become sexually active. However, these are assessed only
at the time of the interviews, so they would not allow the identification strategies used in the
estimation of the model.
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Figure 1: Observed Nonvirginity Rates by Quarter within Grade in High SchoolFigure 1. Observed nonvirginity ates by quarter within grade in high school.
Figure 1a.
Figure 1b.
NOTES: Each line shows a different cohort, defined by grade in the 1994-95 school year. "8-11 avg." 
averages across cohorts, to make synthetic cohort.
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Figure 2: Model FitFigure 2. Model fit.
Figure 2a.
Figure 2b.
NOTES: "8-11 observed" shows the observed rates for the 8th-11th grade cohorts, combined into a 
synthetic cohort; "9 predicted" shows the prediction for the 9th grade cohort from the estimated model.
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Figure 3: Eliminate Effect of Peer Norms on Search DecisionsFigure 3. Elim nate effect of peer norms (no peer influence on search decisions).
Figure 3a.
Figure 3b.
NOTES: "8-11 observed" is 8th-11th grade cohorts, combined; "9 predicted" is prediction for 9th grade 
cohort from estimated model; "9 simulated" is prediction from modified model.
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Figure 4: Eliminate Effect of Opposite Gender Search Behavior on Arrival RatesFigure 4. Eliminate effect of opposite gender s arch behavior on arrival rates.
Figure 4a.
Figure 4b.
NOTES: "8-11 observed" is 8th-11th grade cohorts, combined; "9 predicted" is prediction for 9th grade 
cohort from estimated model; "9 simulated" is prediction from modified model.
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Figure 5: Educational Program Cutting Effect of Peer Norms in HalfFigure 5. Ed cational program cutting effect of peer norms in half.
Figure 5a.
Figure 5b.
NOTES: "8-11 observed" is 8th-11th grade cohorts, combined; "9 predicted" is prediction for 9th grade 
cohort from estimated model; "9 simulated" is prediction from modified model.
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Figure 6: Remove Ninth Grade from High SchoolFigure 6. Remove ninth g ade from high school.
Figure 6a.
Figure 6b.
NOTES: "8-11 observed" is 8th-11th grade cohorts, combined; "9 predicted" is prediction for 9th grade 
cohort from estimated model; "9 simulated" is prediction from modified model.
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Figure 7: Put Virgins and Nonvirgins in Different Schools at Initial Point in TimeFigure 7. Separate vir  and nonvirg ns i to different schools at initial po nt in time.
Figure 7a.
Figure 7b.
NOTES: "8-11 observed" is 8th-11th grade cohorts, combined; "9 predicted" is prediction for 9th grade 
cohort from estimated model; "9 simulated" is prediction from modified model.
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Figure 8: “Low” Type Individuals Never Search (virginity pledge)Figure 8. "Low" type individuals n ver search (virginity pledge).
Figure 8a.
Figure 8b.
NOTES: "8-11 observed" is 8th-11th grade cohorts, combined; "9 predicted" is prediction for 9th grade 
cohort from estimated model; "9 simulated" is prediction from modified model.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Sample Shares with Given Characteristics
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: sample shares with given characteristics.
Unweighted Weighted
Variable Share Share
Individual and family characteristics
  Hispanic 0.179 0.121
  Black 0.217 0.163
  Younger child 0.500 0.488
  Only child 0.190 0.199
  Parent with 16+ years 0.278 0.270
    of education
  Family income > $50K 0.239 0.252
  Mother married 0.601 0.625
  Foreign-born parent 0.156 0.105
  Menarche before 0.263 0.248
    age 12 (girls)
School characteristics
  Urban school district 0.287 0.257
  Ninth grade in separate 0.151 0.065
    location
Table1
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Table 7: Structural Parameter Estimates
Table 7. Structural parameter estimates.
Parameter Boys Girls
Age
α 0.073 0.171
(0.084) (0.098)
Peer preference interaction
γ 0.222 0.147
(0.086) (0.094)
Arrival rate
λ 0 :  9
th
 grade
-2.591 -2.394
(0.301) (0.253)
10th grade -2.884 -2.395
(0.263) (0.247)
11th grade -2.911 -2.403
(0.277) (0.241)
12th grade -2.832 -2.296
(0.298) (0.248)
λ 11 :  Same grade 0.468 0.085
(0.368) (0.280)
λ 12 :  Down / 1 up 0.339 0.103
(boys / girls) (0.251) (0.159)
λ 13 :  Up / 2 up 0.253 0.187
(boys / girls) (0.182) (0.156)
(continues next page)
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Table 7. (continued)
Table 7. Structural parameter estimates.
Parameter Boys Girls
(continued)
Type values
ω
L
-0.263 -0.290
(0.090) (0.099)
ω
H
-0.108 -0.063
(0.074) (0.081)
Terminal values
Low type -1.657 -0.085
(1.087) (1.083)
High type -0.198 0.272
(1.208) (3.872)
Type probabilities (π H )
Constant 0.986 -1.797
(1.223) (1.129)
Y 0  :  9
th
 grade
-1.075 0.248
(2.973) (1.592)
10th grade 0.621 2.000
(2.246) (1.598)
11th grade -1.047 4.461
(2.039) (2.148)
Black 3.535 0.209
(2.955) (0.419)
Younger child 0.830 -0.108
(0.685) (0.341)
Only child 2.351 2.074
(2.151) (1.063)
Parent educ. -2.822 -1.682
(2.297) (0.850)
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